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The aim of this article is to make some corrections to the Sanskrit text and to revise the 
translation of Indian Buddhist Philosophy book Tattvasaṃgraha's (TS) 17th chapter and its 
commentary (Pañjikā; TSP)1. This book is written by Śāntarakṣita (ca.725-788) and his disciple 
Kamalaśīla (ca.740-795) who both belong to Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school. In this chapter 
(kk.1212-13602), they mainly deal with direct perception's (pratyakṣa) non-conceptuality and 
non-erroneousness defined by Buddhist scholar Dharmakīrti (ca. 600-660)3 , and in the part 
kk.1264-1284, they defend the direct perception's non-conceptuality - which Śāntarakṣita has 
demonstrated up to kk.1263 - against a Jainist's criticism. So as to refute the Jainist's theory of direct 
perception, Śāntarakṣita cites Digambara school scholar Sumati in this part. Sumati maintains the 
existence of two kinds of direct perception, in other words, non-conceptual direct perception and 
conceptual direct perception, then argues that the former arises to the universal of high degree which 
is contained in a real entity (vastu) and the latter arises to the universal of low degree and the 
particular. Against this, from the viewpoint that direct perception of individual things is precisely 
non-conceptual, Śāntarakṣita replies that because the universal has a relationship of mutual exclusion 
(anyonyaparihāra) with the particular, on the contrary, it follows that the universal can be grasped 
                                            
1 In order to correct the text and revise the translation of Tattvasaṃgraha's 17th chapter, I have had great instruction 
from Professor Motoi Ono (University of Tsukuba). And I got great advice from Associate Professor Taisei Shida, 
post-graduate students of University of Tsukuba and Ms. Mai Miyo (JSPS research fellow). For translating this 
article, Professor Liana Trufas (Nanzan University) helped me to correct my English and gave me useful suggetions. I 
would like to express heartfelt gratitude here.  
2 In this article, kārikā number of TS and page number of TSP are based on B unless otherwise indicated.  
3 Whether the direct perception is free from conceptual construction or not has been the subject of many and heated 
debates among the scholars of Indian thought. In this dispute, Grammarians (Vaiyākaraṇa) maintain direct 
perception's conceptuality, while Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣikas maintain that there are two kinds of direct 
perception: conceptual and non-conceptual. Those schools who take this position accept the existence of the 
universals other than individual things as the external entity which brings about certain notion. Against this, 
Buddhists maintain the direct perception's non-conceptuality on account of the fact that the universal is a subjective 
conceptual thing and not experienced by perception.  
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by conceptual cognition.  
This controversy has already been introduced by Dr. Masaaki Hattori; at the time of his research, 
neither the background of Sumati's thought nor Dharmakīrti's doctorine which Śāntarakṣita used for 
his answer was clear. However, later studies have brought new information about the master-disciple 
linage of Jainist order, epistemology of Jainism and Dharmakīrti's doctorine. As I had already 
reported the background of Sumati's thought and the answers from Buddhist side in my article 
published in this year (Kaneko[2019a], ibid.[2019b]), by showing corrected text and revised 
translation based on manuscrips I make Sumati and Śāntarakṣita's dispute clear in this article. This 
time I introduce only the first half part which corresponds to synopsis (1)-(2).  
Synopsis:  
(1) kk.1264-1269 
Sumati's objection: Non-conceptual direct perception grasps the universal such as Being itself (sattā) 
and conceptual direct perception grasps the universal such as cowness (gotva) and the particular. On 
the contrary, Kumārila of Mīmāṃsaka school thinks that direct perception grasps individual things. 
But the cognition which grasps the qualified object is conceptual.  
(2) kk.1270-1274 
Buddhists' answer: Direct perception grasps a particular individual thing by excluding it from 
homogeneous and heterogeneous things. Consequently, because each individual things are not 
qualified by qualifier, the direct perception which grasps them is non-conceptual. On the other hand, 
because the universal is distinguished from the particular, it can be grasped by conceptual cognition.  
(3) kk.1275-1276 
Sumati's objection: The universal cannot ontologically be distinguished from the particular, because 
grasping the universal is the same as grasping plural individual things. And as individual things are 
cognized in terms of similarity and dissimilarity, the existence of the universal and the particular are 
established.  
(4) kk.1277-1280 
Buddhists' answer: The universal and the particular are established by mutual exclusion. Then the 
universal and the particular are not grasped by distinct cognitions but by conceptual cognition 
together.  
(5) kk.1281-1283 
Buddhists' answer: The universal is subjective conceptual thing, but is distinguished from fictitious 
thing equivalent to non-being.  
(6) kk.1284 
Conclusion of this part: Cognition with regard to individual things is non-conceptual.  
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  The principle of correction and revise. 
  The principle of correction and revise is as follows:  
(1) Based on the passages of two manuscripts, i.e. Jaisalmer (J) and Paṭṭan (Pt)1, if there are some 
errors in Gaekwad (G) and Bauddha Bharati (B) editions, I make their corrections. In the case there 
seem to be some questionable points in one or another of manuscripts and edited texts, I follow 
Tibetan translations.  
(2) I use sDe dGe (D) and Peking (P) editions about Tibetan translation. I put ahead the 
grammatically appropriate reading ahead, and give another one within (  ). The source locations of 
Tibetan translation cited in footnotes are based on the numbers of sDe dGe edition.  
(3) Marks and Abbreviations:  
  { }: Cancellation made by the manuscripts' writers  
  < >: Margin note of the manuscripts  
  ins.: Insert of words  
  lacking in: Lack of words  
  for: Different translation in Tibetan language  
  em.: Emendation to the content of manuscripts taking into account the consistency of the context.  
  I don't note down the differences concerning the kind and location of shad, adopting those which 
seemed to me appropriate.  
  Orthographic variants (e.g. artha : arttha, viśeṣa : viseṣa, prasaṅga : prasaṃga, ltos : bltos, slu : 
bslu etc.) are not noted down.  
(4) Each paragraph and section number of the text corresponds to synopsis and translation in 
separate sheets.  
 
 
II. Tattvasaṃgraha's 17th Chapter and its Pañjikā 
G379 B463 J154a4 Pt180b16 nanv ityādib17nā prathame hetau sumater digambarasya matenāsiddhatām2 
āśaṅkate.  
    J64a2 Pt24a10 nanu nāmādikaṃ mā bhūt tasya grāhyaṃ viśeṣaṇam | 
    tathāpy asiddhatā hetor naiva vyāvartate a11 yataḥ3/4 || (1264) 
                                            
1 I obtained monochrome version of J and color version of Pt as image data from Professor Hiroshi Nemoto 
(Hiroshima University). And I obtained color version of J through Ms. Mai Miyo, which was taken by Ms. Hiroko 
Matsuoka (Hiroshima University) in Jaisalmer temple in India. I express my appreciation to everyone who provided 
me manuscript data here.  
2 matenāsi .. .ām Pt 
3 vyāvartate yataḥ J, G, B : vyāvartate ya yataḥ Pt 
4 de ni gzung bya'i bye brag las || ming sogs sbyor ba ma yin yang || 'on kyang gtan tshigs ma grub pa || gang gis rjes 
su 'jug pa min || for nanu nāmādikaṃ mā bhūt tasya grāhyaṃ viśeṣaṇam | tathāpy asiddhatā hetor naiva vyāvartate 
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    arthāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ yadi | 
    arthamātragraho a3 vā syād agraho vā ghaṭe yathā || (1265) 
    ghaṭāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ1 yadi | 
    ghaṭamātragraho a12 vā syād agraho vā ghaṭasya vai || (1266) 
sa2 hi sāmānyaviśeṣātmakatvenobhayarūpaṃ sarvaṃ vastu varṇayati. sāmānyaṃ ca dvirūpam − 
viśeṣeṇāPt181a1vacchinnaṃ 3  yathā gotvādi, anavacchinnaṃ yathā sattāvastutvādi. tatra yad 
anavacchinnam ekarūpam, tad ālocanamātrasya4/5 nirvikalpakapratyakṣasya gocaraḥ. itarat punaḥ a5 
savia2kalpakasyety eṣā tasya6 prakriyā.  
  kumārilas tu −  ālocanajñānaṃ 7  nirvikalpakaṃ vyaktisvalakṣaṇaviṣayaṃ varṇayati. 
sāmānyaviṣayaṃ tu savikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam. a3 tatra sumatiḥ 
kumārilādyabhimatālocanamātrapratyakṣavicāraṇārtham8/9/10 āha11 − B464 tadvādīdaṃ praṣṭavyaḥ. 
kiṃ tad indriyasya puraḥsthitam arthamātraṃ svena rūpeṇārthāntarāsama4bhavinā viśiṣṭaṃ gṛa6hyate, 
uta neti12.  
  yady asau brūyāt −  neti, atrocyate −  arthāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ yadi 13 
vivakṣitād arthād yad arthāntaram14, tato vyavacchinnam, tatrāvia5dyamānaṃ vivakṣitārthastham 
rūpaṃ svabhāvaḥ, tena15 viśiṣṭasya yadi tasyārthasyāgrahaṇam iṣyate, tadārthamātragraho16 vā 
syāt17, yat tad arthamātram arthāntarāsambhavi svabhāvaraa6hitam, tasyaiva grahaṇaṃ syāt. atha 
tad api na J154b1 gṛhyate, tadā agraho vā, agrahaṇam eva syāt.  
  ghaṭe yatheti nidarśanam uktam, tac chlokāntareṇa vyācaṣṭe −  ghaṭāntaretyādi.  
avadhīa7kṛtaghaṭāsambhavinā rūpeṇa yadi tasya ghaṭasyāgrahaṇam, tadā ghaṭamātragraho vā 
syāt, kena cid rājatatāmrādinā viśeṣeṇāviśiṣṭasya ghaṭamātrasya grahaṇaṃ syāt. a8 atha 18 
ghaṭamātrasyāpi grahaṇaṃ na bhavati, tadā kasya cid apy abhimatasyāpi na b2 grahaṇaṃ syād ity 
agraho vā ghaṭasya vai. evam atrāpi dārṣṭāntike viśeṣāgrahaṇe 'a9rthamātragrahaṇam agrahaṇaṃ19 
vā syād ity ekāntaḥ.  
                                                                                                                                
yataḥ || T46b6-7 
1 ghaṭāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ J, Pt, G : ghaṭāntara vyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ B 
2 <sumatiḥ> = sa J, Pt margin note 
3 khyab par for viśeṣeṇa T9a3 
4 ālocana° em. B : ālocanā° J, Pt, G 
5 e.. .. .. .. .ālocanā° Pt 
6 de dag gi for tasya T9a4 
7 ālocana° em. B : ālocanā° J, Pt, G 
8 legs pa'i blo gros dang gzhon nu ma len la sogs pas for sumatiḥ kumārilādy T9a5 
9 ālocana° em. B : ālocanā° J, Pt, G 
10 dgag pa for vicāraṇā° T9a5 
11 ins. gal te don gzhan zhes bya ba la sogs pa T9a5 
12 uta neti J, Pt, B : neti G 
13 <sautraṃ padam idaṃ> = arthāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ yadi J, Pt margin note 
14 brjod par 'dod pa'i don gzhan gang yin pa for vivakṣitād arthād yad arthāntaraṃ T9a7 
15 tena lacking in T 
16 tadārthamātra° J, Pt (cf. de'i tshe don tsam T9a7) : tadā tadarthamātra° G, B 
17 <idam api sautraṃ padaṃ> = °ārthamātragraho vā syāt J, Pt margin note 
18 atha J, Pt, B : atha lacking in G 
19 'rthamātragrahaṇam agrahaṇaṃ J : 'rthamātragrahaṇaṃ na grahaṇaṃ Pt, G, B 
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  atha pūrvakaḥ pakṣaḥ, atrāha − grāhyāntaretyādi1.  
    grāhyāntaravyavacchinnabhāvena2 grāhi cen matam | 
    savikalpaa4kavijñānaṃ bhaved vṛkṣādibodhavat || (1267) 
G380 yadi paratrāsambhavinā svarūpeṇa viśiṣṭārthagrāhīna10driyajñānam abhipretam 3 , tadā 
savikalpaṃ4 prāpnoti, kena cid rūpeṇa viśiṣṭārthagrāhitvād vṛkṣo 'yam ityādibodhavat.  
  syān matam5 − nārthamātraṃ6 nāma kiṃ b3/a11 cid asti, yat7 svarūpeṇa viśiṣya8 gṛhyate. kiṃ 
tarhi yat tad viśiṣṭaṃ rūpaṃ tava mama9 viśeṣābhimatam, tad evāsti gṛhyate B465 ceti. ata āha10 − 
viśeṣo11 'spṛṣṭasāa12mānyo12 na ca13 kaś cana vidyata iti. 
    viśeṣo 'spṛṣṭasāmānyo na ca kaś cana via13dyate | 
    grahaṇe cet tadaspṛṣṭaṃ14 vibhāvatvān na gṛhyate15 || (1268) 
arthamātraṃ16 nāma sāmānyam ucyate, yat tat sattety ākhyāyate. tannirapekṣo17 na kaś cid viśeṣo 
vidyate, yo gṛhyeta18. tatraitat syāa13t − tvanmatyā yady api tad asti sāmānyam, grahab4ṇakāle tu 
tan na spṛśyata ity āha19 − grahaṇe cet tadaspṛṣṭaṃ20 vibhāvatvān na gṛhyata iti. grahaṇakāle 
yadi tat sāmānyaṃ21 sattākhyaṃ ina14driyajñānena na spṛśyate viśeṣamātram eva gṛhyate, tadā tad 
viśeṣamātraṃ gṛhyamāṇaṃ bhāvarahitaṃ sattākhyaṃ22 svabhāvavikalaṃ23 niḥsvabhāvaṃ prāptam 
iti nendriyajñānagrāa15hyaṃ syāt, vibhāvatvād vigatabhāvatvād viyatpuṣpab5vad iti.  
    viśiṣṭaviṣayo bodhaḥ kalpanā neti sāhasam | 
    a5 na viśeṣaṇasambandhād ṛte vaiśiṣṭyasambhavaḥ || (1269) 
tasmād viśiṣṭaviṣayo bodho 'tha ca kalpanā nāstīti sāhasam etad bhavatāṃ pramāṇabādhitam 
abhyua16pagacchatām ity upasaṃhāraḥ. atraivopapattim āha −  na viśeṣaṇetyādi. na hi 
daṇḍasambandham antareṇa tadvān bhavati, tadvad viśiṣṭo 'pi viśeṣaṇasambandham24 antareṇa na 
yukta a17 iti bhāvaḥ. tasmād yad viśeṣaṇasambandhagrahaṇam, tat savikalpakam iti.  
                                            
1 grāhyāntare° J, G, B : grāhyantare° Pt 
2 vyavacchinna° J, Pt (cf. rnam bcad pa'i T47a1) : vyavacchinnaṃ G, B 
3 abhipretam J, G, B (cf. 'dod na T9b4) : anabhipretaṃ Pt 
4 savikalpaṃ J, Pt : savikalpakaṃ G, B 
5 <kumārilasya> = syān matam J, Pt margin note; kumārilasyedaṃ matam B 
6 .. .. .ātraṃ Pt 
7 yat J, G, B (cf. gang zhig T9b5) : tat Pt 
8 viśiṣya em. G, B : viśeṣya J, Pt 
9 mama lacking in T 
10 <sumatiḥ> = āha J, Pt margin note; sumatir iti śeṣah B 
11 .. .e ṣ. Pt 
12 aspṛṣṭa° J, Pt (cf. reg pa ma yin pa'i T9b6) : aspaṣṭa° G, B 
13 na ca J, G, B : na ca na ca Pt 
14 °aspṛṣṭaṃ J, Pt (cf. ma reg pas T47a2) : °aspaṣṭaṃ G, B 
15 ins. de phyir nam mkha'i me tog bzhin || dngos med 'di na'ang gzung ba (D : ba lacking in P) min || T47a2 
16 arthamātraṃ J (cf. don tsam T9b6) : atra mātraṃ Pt, G, B 
17 gzung bar bya ba de la ltos pa med pa'i for tannirapekṣo T9b7 
18 gṛhyeta J, Pt, G : gṛhyate B 
19 <sumatiḥ> = āha J, Pt margin note 
20 °aspṛṣṭaṃ J, Pt (cf. ma reg T9b7) : °aspaṣṭaṃ G, B 
21 phyir for sāmānyaṃ T10a1 
22 sattākhyaṃ Pt : sattākhya° J, G, B 
23 stong pa for vikalaṃ T10a1 
24 viśeṣaṇasambandham em. (cf. viśeṣaṇasambandhād TS1269'c) : viśeṣasambandham J, Pt, G, B 
THE JOURNAL OF INTERCULTURAL STUDIES                  No. 41 (2019) 
 
60 
  b6 prayogaḥ − vivādāspadībhūtaṃ viśiṣṭaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ savikalpakam, viśiṣṭaviṣayatvāt paṭo1 
'Pt181b1yam ityādi jñānavad iti.  
  sajātīyetyādinā pratividhatte2. 
    sajātīyavia14jātīyavyāvṛttārthagrahān mataḥ | 
    viśiṣṭaviṣayo bodho na viśeṣaṇasaṅgateḥ || (1270) 
tad3 atra yadi vyatiriktaviśeṣaṇasambandhād4/5 viśiṣṭaviṣayatvād iti hetvarthaḥ, tadā na siddho 
hetuḥ. tab2thā hi −  na bauJ155a1ddhasya viśeṣaṇaṃ nāma kiṃ cid asti, yena 
tatsaG381mbandhagrahaṇād viśiṣṭaviṣayo B466 bodhaḥ syāt. kiṃ tarhi sajātīyavijātīyebhyo 
vyāvṛttasyārthamātrasya grab3hād grahaṇān mato iṣṭaḥ6 viśiṣṭaviṣayo bodhaḥ.  
  kathaṃ tarhi viśiṣtatvam asya. vaiśiṣṭyam asyetyādi vyapadeśo vyatirekīvety7 āha − bheda 
ityādi.  
    bhedo vaiśiṣṭyam uktaṃ hi na viśeṣaa6ṇasaṅgatiḥ8 | 
    bhinnam ity api tad vācā nānuvia15ddhaṃ pratīyate || (1271) 
bhedaḥ sajātīb4yavijātīyebhyo 9  vyāvṛttiḥ. sā ca nānyā vyāvṛttād bhāvāt 10 . bhāva eva hi a2 
bhedāntarapratikṣepeṇa tanmātrajijñāsāyāṃ tathocyate.  
  syād etat −  yadi vijātīyasajātīyeb5bhyo bhinnasya vastuno grahaṇam, niyamena tarhi 
savikalpakaṃ grahaṇaṃ prāptam, bhinnam etad ity evamākārapravṛttatvāt. anyathā kathaṃ 
tadviṣayaṃ syāt, yady anyākārab6pravṛttaṃ bhavet. na hy anyākārapravṛttaṃ tadviṣayaṃ yuktam 
atiprasaṅgād ity āśaṅkyāha − bhinnam ity api tad ia3tyādi.  
  kathaṃ tarhi bhinnam ity abhidhīyata ity āha − svabhāvāpab7retyādi. 
    svabhāvāparaniḥśeṣapadārthavyatirekiJ64b1ṇi | 
    gṛhīte sati tasmiṃs tu vikalpo jāyate tathā || (1272) 
svabhāvād apare ye niḥśeṣāḥ padārthāḥ, tebhyo vyatirekiṇi vyāvṛtte gṛhīte sati 11 , 
asādhāraṇanīlādyākārapratibhāsanāt paścād12 bhedādhyavasāyī13 b8 śabdākārānusyūto14  bhinnam 
ity abhilapann utpadyate vikalpaḥ15. na ca vastv16 abhilāpasvabhāvaṃ tatsaṃsṛṣṭātmatvaṃ17 vā, 
                                            
1 bum pa for paṭa T10a4 
2 <bauddhaḥ> = pratividhatte J, Pt margin note; ācāryaḥ śāntarakṣita iti śeṣaḥ B 
3 tad J (cf. de'i phyir T10a5) : yad Pt, G, B 
4 saṃbandhāt || J, sambandhād B : sabaṃdhāt | Pt : sambandhāt (iti) G 
5 vyatiriktaviśeṣaṇasambandhād for tha dad pa'i phyir khyad par dang 'brel ba las T10a5 
6 iṣṭaḥ J, B (cf. khas len pa T47a3) : iṣṭaḥ lacking in Pt, G 
7 tha snyad dang tha dad pa ... yin zhe na for vyapadeśo vyatirekīvety T10a7 
8 tha dad de yang bye brag can || zhes brjod bye brag 'brel bas min || for bhedo vaiśiṣṭyam uktaṃ hi na 
viśeṣaṇasaṅgatiḥ | T47a3 
9 °vijātīyebhyo em. G, B : °vijātīyabhyo J, Pt 
10 bhāvāt lacking in T 
11 saty J, G, B : sadha? ty Pt 
12 paścād lacking in T 
13 paścā... .. .yavasāyī Pt 
14 °ānusyūto J, Pt (cf. rjes su byed pa T, śabdākārānusyūta° TSP ad TS128kk, 135kk, 142-143kk) : °ānusmṛto G, B 
15 brjod pa can gyi rnam par rtog pa skye ba yin no for abhilapann utpadyate vikalpaḥ T10b4 
16 na ca vastv J, Pt (cf. dngos po ... kyang ma yin no T10b4-5) : na ced astv G, B 
17 tatsaṃsṛṣṭātmatvaṃ em. (cf. de dang ldan pa'i bdag nyid T10b5) : tatsaṃsṛṣṭātmatattvaṃ J, Pt, G, B 
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yena bhinnam ity abhinnam iti1 nāmnā2 a4 saṃyob9jya grahaṇe asati, agṛhītaṃ3 syāt. tasmād 
asiddha eva hetuḥ.  
  atha vyāvṛttivaśād 4  viśiṣṭa iti kṛtvā viśiṣṭaviṣayatvād iti hetvarthaḥ 5 
nārthāntaravib10śeṣaṇasambandhāt, tadāpi svato 'naikāntiko 6  hetur iti darśayann āha − 
viśeṣaB467ṇetyādi.  
    viśeṣaṇānavacchinnaṃ7/8 paraiḥ sāmānyam iṣyate | 
    a16 nirvikalpakavijñānagrāhyaṃ9 tatrāpy adaḥ10 samam || (1273) 
dvirūpaṃ hi sāmānyaṃ viśeṣaṇāvacchinnarūpam anavacchinnab11rūpaṃ ca. tatra yad 
anavacchinnaa5rūpam, tan nirvikalpakavijñānagrāhyam iṣṭam. tatrāpi −  sāmānye ada 11 
etadvikalpakavijñānagrāhyatvaṃ tulyam.  
  G382 katham ity āha − viśeṣād dhīb12tyādi.  
    viśeṣād dhi viśiṣṭaṃ tat12 sāb2mānyam avagamyate | 
    tadgrāhakam ataḥ prāptaṃ vijñānaṃ savikalpakam || (1274) 
yasmād13 viśeṣād viśiṣṭaṃ vyāvṛttaṃ tat sāmānyaṃ14 pratīyate. anyathā sāmānyam eva na syāt, 
tato yadi na vyāvarteta15. tataś cāsyāpi sāmānyasya viśeb13ṣād vyāvṛttasya grāhakaṃ vijñānaṃ 
savikalpakaṃ prāpnoti, a6 viśiṣṭaviṣayatvāt16. na ca bhavati tvanmatena. tasmāt svato 'nekānta17 iti. 




1.1.1. [Objection:] Sumati's ontology and epistemology.  
Through Sumati's thought ― who belonging to Digambara school ― expressed by such 
expressions like "Isn't it that ..." etc., [Śāntarakṣita] anticipates non-establishment of the first reason 
                                            
1 abhinnam iti lacking in T 
2 abhinna .. .. .āmnā Pt 
3 saṃyojya grahaṇe asati, agṛhītaṃ em. (cf. sbyor ba ma bzung (D : gzung P) ba na (D : ni P) mi 'dzin par T10b4) : 
saṃyojyāgrahaṇe saty agṛhītaṃ J : saṃyojyāgrahaṇe satyi gṛhītaṃ Pt : saṃyojya grahaṇe saty agṛhītaṃ B : saṃyojya 
grahaṇe sati gṛhītaṃ G 
4 dogs pa'i for vyāvṛtti T10b5 
5 hetva .thaḥ Pt 
6 'naikāntiko em. : (a)naikāntiko J, Pt : naikāntiko G, B 
7 viśeṣaṇānavacchinnaṃ Pt, G, B : viśeṣaṇānav{i}acchinnaṃ J 
8 bye brag tu ni ma bzung la for viśeṣaṇānavacchinnaṃ T47a4 
9 rtog pa dang bcas shes pa la || 'dzin na for nirvikalpakavijñānagrāhyaṃ T47a4 
10 adaḥ J, Pt : ataḥ G, B 
11 ada J : ata Pt, G, B 
12 de la for tat T47a5 
13 yasmād J, Pt, B (cf. gang gi phyir T10b7) : yad dhy asmād G 
14 phyir for sāmānyaṃ T11a1 
15 vyāvartteta Pt, G, B : vyāvarttete J 
16 viśiṣṭa° J, Pt, G : viśiviṣṭa° B 
17 nekāṃta J, Pt : 'naikānta G, B 
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[which negates the existence of genus etc.]1.  
    A qualifier such as name etc. is not something graspable by that [i.e. direct perception], 
and should it be true [i.e. name etc. could not be graspable by direct perception], [the 
consequence] isn't it that non-establishment of the reason is inevitable? Because if [one] 
does not grasp [an object] by excluding it from the other objects, it follows that [one] or 
grasps the object itself or does not grasp at all. For example in the case of a pot, if [one] 
does not grasp [the pot] by excluding it from the other pots, it follows that [one] or grasps 
the pot itself or does not grasp it at all. (1264-66) 
In other words, he [i.e. Sumati2] explains that all real entities have two essences in the sense that 
they possess both the universal and the particular as their essence. Moreover, the universal has two 
essences. For example, [the universal] such as cowness etc. being qualified by qualifier, and [the 
universal] such as Being itself and Reality itself etc. not being qualified. Among them, [the latter 
universal] ―  which has not-distinguished and single essence ―  is the cognitive realm of 
non-conceptual direct perception, i.e. the mere perception (ālocanamātra). The former [universal] is 
[the cognitive realm] of conceptual [direct perception]. The above is his explanation of definitions.  
 
1.1.2. [Objection:] Dispute between Sumati and Kumārila3.  
But Kumārila explains that perceptual cognition (ālocanajñāna) is non-conceptual and has the 
particular aspect of individual things as its object. On the other hand, [he explains that] conceptual 
                                            
1 In order to prove direct perception's non-conceptuality, Śāntarakṣita begins the dispute with Sumati anticipating 
that the reason used for negating the existence of qualifier such as genus etc. is not established. Jha[1937: 635] and 
Hattori[1959: 118] think that the reason is shown in TS1257-60(G), but introductory sentence in TSP463,17 states 
that Śāntarakṣita anticipates that the first reason is not established (prathame hetau ... asiddhatām āśaṅkate.). This 
kind of proof had already been done in TS1219. There, he negated the existence of genus etc. by the reason  
"because genus etc. are not perceptible apart from individual things". cf. jātyādīnām adṛṣṭatvāt tadyogāpratibhāsanāt | 
kṣīrodakādivac cārthe ghaṭanā ghaṭate katham || (1219) Tr: Insofar as a genus, etc., is not perceived and [― even if it 
did exist ―] its connection [with the substruatum] does not manifest itself ― as, for example, in (the mixture of) 
milk and water, etc. ― how is it possible to connect it with the object? (I follow Funayama[1992: 71, note86] about 
textual correction and translation.);  
Moreover, Śāntarakṣita negates the existence of qualifier involved in perception in TS1256-59. cf. yadi vā yasya 
bhāvasya yadrūpasthitikāraṇam | na vidyate na tattvena sa vyavasthāpyate buddhaiḥ || (1256) avidyamānasāsnādir 
yathā karko gavātmanā | viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthagrahaṇaṃ na ca vidyate || (1257) savikalpakabhāvasya sthiter ākṣe 
nibandhanam | vipakṣaḥ śābaleyādir anyathātiprasajyate || (1258) na cāprasiddhatā hetor jātyādeḥ pratiṣedhataḥ | 
bhedena cāparicchedān na cāsty evaṃ viśeṣaṇam || (1259) Tr: Furthermore, if (yadi vā!) there is a certain entity 
(yasya!) no causal basis (kāraṇa) to ascertain a certain form, that (entity) is not ascertained as such by wise people 
[1256], as for example white horse (karka), where there is no dewlap, etc., (is not established) as a cow; and in direct 
perception (ākṣa) there is no cognition of an object ― as a causal basis (nibandhana) ― qualified by qualifiers for 
ascertaining a conceptuality (savikalpakabhāva) [1257-58ab]. The (cows) śābaleya, etc., are heterogeneous examples. 
Otherwise, undesireble conclusions would follow [1258cd]. Moreover, the reason is not established (aprasiddha) 
because (qualifiers) such as genus are negated (by us) and because (they are) not determined as different [from their 
substratum, even if it were assumed that genus etc., are real entities,] and as such, [i.e., as not thus determined,] 
qualifiers do not exist [1259]. (I follow Funayama[1992: 108, note262, 263] about textual correction and translation.) 
2 I follow the margin note of J, Pt.  
3 In Jha's translation, it is not clear where is the end of Sumati and Kumārila's dispute. But if we follow the margin 
note of manuscripts to pronouns, we can understand that at least the dispute between them continues until TSP465,14.  
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direct perception has the universal as its object1. Against this, in order to examine the direct 
perception ― i.e. mere perception ― which is accepted by Kumārila etc., Sumati says: "Those 
who claim such things should be asked as follows: Which is true: the object itself present in front of 
one's eyes is or is not grasped as qualified by its own essence which can not exist in any other 
thing?" 
 
1.1.3. [Objection:] Direct perception has one of the following alternatives: It 
grasps the object itself or it grasps nothing.  
If he [i.e. Kumārila] says that [we] never [grasp in this way], against this [Sumati] replies as 
follows: "If [one] does not grasp [an object] by excluding it from the other objects", this means 
that, since the essence or the own nature of the intended object does not exist in objects other than 
it i.e. in the things excluded from it, if the [intended] object is qualified in this way, it is considered 
as not being grasped. In this case, it follows that [one] grasps the object itself or [not]. In other 
words: Given the fact that the object itself could not be other thing and it lacks [the other's] own 
nature, it follows that [one] grasps [the object] itself. Or, in the case when it is not grasped, it 
follows that [one] does not grasp anything at all or [not] i.e. nothing is grasped at all.  
  "For example in regard to the pot" is the expression of an example and, through another śloka 
[i.e. 1266], [Sumati] explains it as "from the other pots" etc. [That is:] If [one] does not grasp the 
pot by being impossible for another pots2, in this case it follows that [one] grasps the pot itself or 
[not]. In other words, it follows that [one] grasps the pot itself not qualified by some qualifier such 
as being of silver or of copper etc. Or, even when [one] is not capable to grasp the pot itself, in this 
case it follows that [one] does not grasp any intended [object]. This is "[one] does not grasp the pot 
                                            
1 Kumārila explains in ŚV's 4th chapter that non-conceptual direct perception to individual things arises at first, then 
conceptual direct perception to genus etc. such as the universal and the particular arises. Cf. asti hy ālocanajñānaṃ 
prathamaṃ nirvikalpakam | bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśaṃ śuddhavastujam || (112) na viśeṣo na sāmānyaṃ tadānīm 
anubhūyate | tayor ādhārabhūtā tu vyaktir evāvasīyate || (113) nirvikalpakabodhe 'pi dvyātmakasyāpi vastunaḥ | 
grahaṇaṃ lakṣaṇākhyeyaṃ jñātrā śuddhaṃ tu gṛhyate || (118) na hy asādhāraṇatvena paravyāvṛttyakalpanāt | 
viśeṣānugamākḷpteḥ sāmānyam iti nāpi tat || (119) tataḥ paraṃ punar vastu dharmair jātyādibhir yayā | 
buddhyāvasīyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena saṃmatā || (120) Tr: For there is indeed first a cognition of mere seeing that is 
non-conceptual, which is similar to the cognitions of infants and the speechless, etc., and which arises from 
undifferentiated object. At that time neither the universal nor the difference of the object is experienced [distinctly]; 
rather only the individual, which serves as the receptacle both, is ascertained. (112-113) Even in a 
non-conceptualized awareness there is an apprehension of a hing that has a dual nature, which is known indirectly. 
However, the undifferentiated object is apprehended by the knower. (118) For it is not perceived as unique, because 
there is no distinguishing it from others; nor as a universal, because of the absence of a conception of being common 
to [other] particulars. (119) The cognition, however, by which the thing is subsequently ascertained by means of 
properties such as its genus, etc., is also considered perception. (120) (I follow Taber[2005: 94-96] about textual 
correction and translation.) 
2 The word "avadhīkṛta" appears in TS/TSP's 20th chapter, and is used when a Jainist proves the existence of the 
particular. cf. avadhīkṛtavastubhyo vairūpyarahitaṃ yadi | tadvastu na bhaved bhinnaṃ tebhyo 'bhedāt tadātmavat || 
(1716) TSP595,5-6 Tr: If [a certain entity] is devoid of dissimilarity from the other entities, the entity would not be 
different from them. Because there is no difference. As is the case of [the entity] itself. (I follow Wakahara[1995: 77, 
90, note38] about textual correction and translation.) 
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at all or [not]". Similarly in the case shown by the example, if [one] does not grasp [the object] by 
qualification, it follows that [one] grasps the object itself or does not grasp it at all. This is the 
alternative choice.  
 
1.2. [Objection:] The direct perception of individual things is conceptual because it 
has qualified object.  
If the former is [Sumati's] claim, concerning it [Sumati] maintains "the other grasped [object]" 
etc.  
    If [sense cognition] is intended as [the direct perception] which grasps [an object] by 
excluding it from the other grasped [objects], it would be conceptual cognition. For 
example, the cognition like "[this is] a tree" etc1. (1267)  
If sense cognition is intended as [the direct perception] which grasps an object qualified by its 
nature impossible in the other [objects], in this case it would be conceptual. This is so because it 
grasps an object qualified by a specific essence. For example, the cognition like "[this is] a tree" 
etc.  
 
1.3. [Objection:] The object itself which is perceived is the universal. And the 
universal penetrates individual things.  
[Kumārila2] thinks as follows: No object itself which is grasped as being qualified by its nature 
exists at all. However, the qualified essence is considered by both for you and me as the particular, 
and it is precisely it [i.e. the particular] which exists and is grasped. Such being the case, [Sumati3] 
maintains that "But the particular which has no relation to the universal does not exist at all".  
    But the particular which has no relation to the universal does not exist at all. If [one] 
grasps [it] with no relation to that [i.e. the universal], [in fact] it would not be grasped, 
because [in this case, the particular] has no existence4. (1268)  
The object itself means the universal, and it [i.e. the universal] is called Being itself. As capable of 
being grasped, the particular which has no relation to it [i.e. the universal] does not exist at all. 
Concerning this [point], [Sumati5] seems to think as follows: "In your [i.e. Kumārila's] view, even 
                                            
1 According to Śāntarakṣita, even if not being associated with verbal expression, the cognition "this is a tree" 
includes conceptual construnction. cf. śabdārthaghaṭanāyogyā vṛkṣa ityādirūpataḥ | yā vācām aprayoge 'pi 
sābhilāpeva jāyate || (1214) Tr: That [cognition] which is capable of connecting a word with an object, even if the 
word in the form of "tree" etc. is not actually applied, appears as if it were connected with an expression. (I follow 
Funayama[1992: 64, 90, note53] about textual correction and translation.)  
2 I follow the margin note of J, Pt. 
3 I follow the margin note of J, Pt. 
4 The ontology mentioned in TS1268 seems to be the premise of the epistemology stated in TS1275.  
5 I follow the margin note of J, Pt. 
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grating that the universal exists, it is not seized at the moment of the grasp. If [one] grasps [it] with 
no relation to that [i.e. the universal], [the particular] has no existence, [in fact] it would not be 
grasped." In other words: "If at the moment of the grasp, the universal called Being itself is not 
seized by sense cognition and only the particular itself is grasped, in this case it follows that the 
particular itself which is grasped is devoid of the nature called Being itself, it lacks its own nature or 
has no own nature. The consequence is that it is not graspable by sense cognition. This is so because 
[the particular] has no existence, i.e. because [it] is devoid of nature. Just like the sky-flower1."  
 
1.4. [Objection:] It is concluded that the direct perception of individual things is 
conceptual.  
    It is hasty [to claim] that [sence] cognition has a qualified object, [moreover] that there is 
no conceptual construction [in sense cognition]. [It is] because no difference is possible 
apart from a connection with a qualifier. (1269)  
From the above [claim], [Sumati's] conclusion is as follows: It is hasty [to claim] that [sense] 
cognition has a qualified object, moreover that there is no conceptual construction [in sense 
cognition], given the fact that you accept the invalidation by cognitive instrument. It is precisely 
concerning this that [Sumati] maintains his proof "[It is] because no ... with a qualifier." etc. In 
other words: Apart from any connection with a stick, there is no possessor of it. Likewise, apart from 
any connection with a qualifier, no qualified object is possible. Therefore, if [one] grasps any 
connection with a qualifier, this kind of [grasping] is associated with conceptual construction.  
  The syllogism: [Thesis:] The subject of dispute, the cognition with qualified object [i.e. direct 
perception of individual things] is associated with conceptual construction. [Reason:] Because it has 




                                            
1 In TS/TSP's 20th chapter, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla introduce a Jainist theory that things commonly have their 
universality, or they become non-being like sky flower (khapuṣpa) unless they have it. cf. bhāvo bhāvāntarātulyaḥ 
khapuṣpān na viśiṣyate | (1709ab) ... kiṃ cid vivakṣitaṃ vastu ghaṭādi, sa yadi ghaṭādir bhāvaḥ paṭādinā 
bhāvāntareṇātulyaḥ syāt, tato yadi vyāvṛttaḥ syāt, tadā khapuṣpān na tasya viśeṣaḥ syāt. sarvathā vastvantarād 
vyāvṛttatvāt. na ca vastvantarād vyāvṛttasyānyā gatiḥ sambhavati khapuṣpatāṃ muktvā. tasmāt tasya vastunaḥ 
khapuṣpātulyatvam abhyupagacchatā bhāvāntaratulyatvaṃ vastutvaṃ nāma sāmānyam abhyupagantavyam iti 
siddhaṃ sāmānyātmakatvam.TSP593,6-594,1 Tr: If a thing is not equal to other things [at all], it would not be 
distinguished from sky flower [i.e. non-being]. (1709ab) ... a thing means arbitrary certain entity, [just like] a pot 
etc. If this thing such as pot is not equal to other things such as cloth [at all] or [entirely] different from [other 
things], it would not be distinguished from sky flower. Because it is entirely different from other entities. In fact, a 
thing which is different from other entities has no other way but to be the sky flower. Consequently, those who admit 
that this entity is not the same with sky flower must admit the existence of similarity or the universal such as Reality 
itself. (I follow Wakahara[1995: 74-75, 90, note31] about textual correction and translation. Therefore, it is proved 
that [entity] has the universal as its essence.) 
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2.1.1. [Answer:] Direct perception grasps a particular individual thing excluded 
from other homogeneous and heterogeneous things.  
By "Homogeneous things" etc., [Śāntarakṣita] replies.  
    [Sense] cognition is regarded as having qualified object. Not because it is associated with a 
qualifier, but because it grasps the object excluded from homogeneous and heterogeneous 
things. (1270)  
Concerning the above mentioned [syllogism], if [Sumati gives] the reason as "Because it has 
qualified object" in the sense that it is based on the connection with a qualifier negatively related to 
[Buddhist's reason], in this case the reason is not established. In other words: For Buddhist, no 
qualifier exists; otherwise, based on the grasping of the connection with that [i.e. the qualifier], 
[sense] cognition would have a qualified object. Rather, because [sense] cognition grasps i.e. 
cognizes the object itself excluded from both homogeneous and heterogeneous things, it is 
regarded, i.e. it is accepted as having a qualified object.  
 
2.1.2. [Answer:] Individual things are not qualified by a qualifier and are ineffable.  
If such is the case, how this [i.e. the object] is qualified? As to the fact that the expression "this 
[i.e. the object] is qualified etc." has a negative [meaning], [Śāntarakṣita] states "[nothing other 
than] an individual thing / distinction" etc.  
    This is so because [nothing other than] an individual thing / distinction is said to be 
qualified, and it [i.e. the individual thing / distinction] is not associated with a qualifier. 
Moreover, this [i.e. the qualified object] is not considered as penetrated with the 
expression "it is different". (1271) 
An individual thing / distinction means exclusion from both homogeneous and heterogeneous 
things. And that [i.e. act of exclusion] does not differ from the excluded things. In other words, 
precisely [that] thing is said to be [qualified] in the above way, when [one] wants to know that [i.e. 
the thing] itself by the exclusion of other individual things.  
  [Sumati] might [refute the argument] as follows: If [one] grasps a real entity different from both 
homogeneous and heterogeneous things, in this case the grasp is necessarily conceptual. This is so 
because [the grasp of a qualified object] operates in [conceptual] way such as "it is different". 
Otherwise, if [the grasp] operates differently [i.e. in non-conceptual way], how could it have that [i.e. 
real entity excluded from the other things] as its object? That is to say: Since [this involves the fault 
of] overextension, [non-conceptual grasp] which operates differently cannot have it as its object. 
Concerning the above, [Śāntarakṣita] states "Moreover, this [i.e. the qualified object] is ...  "it is 
different"."etc.  
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2.1.3. [Answer:] After the non-conceptual direct perception, conceptual cognition 
associated with verbal expression arises.  
If [Sumati] says "why then is it said to be different?", [Śāntarakṣita] states "different from 
itself" etc.  
    On the other hand, when [an individual thing] has already been grasped as distinguished 
from all other things which are different from itself, in regard to it there arises such a [i.e. 
"it is different"] conceptual construction. (1272) 
When [an individual thing] has already been grasped as distinguished i.e. excluded from all 
those other things which are different from itself, after the manifestation of [for example] the 
form of unique blue [color] etc., there arises the conceptual construction with the verbal expression 
"it is different"1, which determines the individual thing [or] distinction and which entails the form of 
words. But the real entity does not have verbal expression as its own nature nor is it associated with 
it [i.e. verbal expression] as its nature. Otherwise, unless [one] grasps it [i.e. the real entity] 
associated with appellations such as "different" or "not different", there would be no grasp of [the 
real entity]. Therefore, [your] reason ["Because it has qualified object"] is not established at all.  
 
2.2.1. [Answer:] If non-conceptual cognition grasps the universal, it follows that it has 
qualified object.  
If thinking that "it is qualified" is based not on the connection with the qualifier which is a factor  
different from [the real entity] but on exclusion, [Sumati makes clear] the meaning of the reason 
"Because it has qualified object", in this case too the reason is inconclusive by itself. In order to 
indicate the above, [Śāntarakṣita] states "by qualifier" etc.  
    Even if the universal not qualified by qualifier is accepted by the opponents and it is 
grasped through non-conceptual cognition, in the case of this kind of [universal] too, that 
fact [i.e. the fact of having qualified object] is the same as [the fact of being grasped 
through conceptual cognition]. (1273) 
This is to say: The universal has two essences: there is the universal which has an essence qualified 
by qualifier and the universal which has an essence not qualified. Among the [two essences], 
non-qualified essence is accepted [by the opponents] as being grasped through non-conceptual 
cognition2. In the case of this kind of universal too, that fact [i.e. the fact of having qualified 
                                            
1 In kk.729 of 13rd chapter, Śāntarakṣita explains the transition from sense cognition to conceptual cognition 
associated with words. There, he explains that recollection (smṛti) brings about conceptual cognition. Cf. ajalpākāram 
evādau vijñānaṃ tu prajāyate | tatas tu samayābhogas tasmāt smārtaṃ tato 'pi te || (729) Tr:At first, the cognition in a 
form free from verbal expression arises. The memory of verbal convention then arises. Hence, they [i.e. the notions 
of being etc.] are recollected. And from the fact that [conceptual cognition determines the perceived one as such], 
they are recollected. (729) (I follow Takenaka[1979: 41] about textual correction and translation.) 
2 This is Sumati's view in TSP ad TS1264-66.  
THE JOURNAL OF INTERCULTURAL STUDIES                  No. 41 (2019) 
 
68 
object] is the same as the fact of being grasped through conceptual cognition mentioned above.  
 
2.2.2. [Answer:] The universal is distinguished from the particular and grasped 
by conceptual cognition.  
If [Sumati] asks why is it so, [Śāntarakṣita] states "It is so because ... from the particular" etc. 
    It is so because the universal is understood as distinguished (viśiṣṭa) from the particular. 
Therefore, the cognition which grasps it follows that it is conceptual. (1274) 
It is so because the thing distinguished i.e. excluded from the particular is understood as the 
universal. Otherwise, if it is not excluded from that [i.e. the particular], the universal would be 
impossible. And therefore the cognition which grasps this universal excluded from the particular 
has qualified object, so it also follows that it is conceptual. According to your view, however, this 
is not so. Consequently, [your reason "Because it has qualified object" cannot be but] inconclusive 
by itself.  




  In this way, although Sumati and Śāntarakṣita agree with the fact that individual things are 
excluded from the other things, they have different perspectives about the process of perceptual 
cognition of individual things: Sumati thinks that non-conceptual cognition grasps Being itself and 
conceptual cognition grasps the qualified objects including individual things. On the other hand, 
Śāntarakṣita thinks that non-conceptual cognition grasps a particular individual thing which is not 
qualified by qualifier. Therefore, Sumati and Śāntarakṣita use the word "qualified/excluded" in 
different meanings. In other words, Sumati considers that individual things are similar to each other 
in a certain respect, because of Being itself. On the contrary, Śāntarakṣita considers that each 
particular individual thing differs from homogeneous things and heterogeneous things.  
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